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In the current study, participants performed an ongoing lexical decision task (LDT) in which
they had to classify letter strings as words or non-words. In intention conditions, they
also had to encode a postponed intention to remember to make a different response if
a pre-specified cue appeared. Attempting to replicate an important finding from Cohen
et al. (2008), the interest was in examining how varying cognitive load associated with an
intention influences attention to the ongoing task (measured by reaction times). Typically,
disengaging from a primary task is perceived as negative as it can lead to performance
decrements, however, if disengaging from a primary task helps one to accomplish a
desired future goal, then these attentional shifts may in fact be constructive. Results
replicated those of Cohen et al. (2008) and showed that participants were very flexible
in how they managed attention in the ongoing LDT. Reaction time costs emerged when
cognitive load was high and solely for word trials (i.e., not for non-word trials). The
implications for mind wandering are that, while our attention may wander when stimuli
are present that trigger a suspended or unfulfilled goal, we are better able to stay on task
when the stimuli are less goal relevant. Therefore, the decoupling process (e.g., Schooler
et al., 2011) might be initiated when postponed goals are accompanied by a high degree
of cognitive load and when external stimuli are present that relate to that goal.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, people strive to attain multiple goals, some that
are simple and short-term (e.g., choosing a shampoo brand), and
others that are complex, long-term and require repeated efforts
(e.g., applying for jobs). The average individual must consider
viable opportunities to act on suspended goals while maintain-
ing high levels of performance on ongoing behaviors. Very often,
goals must be postponed until the appropriatemoment arrives for
their execution. Prospective memory (PM) refers to remembering
to carry out delayed intentions (Einstein and McDaniel, 1990).
The successful execution of intentions has important implications
for many facets of everyday life including health (remembering
to take medication), social (remembering a friend’s birthday),
and safety (remembering to turn off the stove before leaving the
house).
Intention completion requires that the cognitive system be
configured in such a way that the person is sensitive to informa-
tion that facilitates a goal-relevant behavior or encodes a sufficient
link between an anticipated environmental cue and an action
(Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999). Indeed, some research (e.g., Goschke
and Kuhl, 1993; Marsh et al., 1998; Cohen et al., 2005, 2011) has
shown that information related to intentions is highly accessible
compared to information that is not future-oriented. This phe-
nomenon was termed the “intention superiority effect” (Goschke
and Kuhl, 1993). For example, if a person must remember to
mail an important letter, he or she might be especially sensi-
tive to noticing a mailbox or any stimulus that relates to posting
a letter while performing an unrelated activity such as walk-
ing the dog. Noticing a stimulus that is relevant to a postponed
goal involves a shift of attention from a currently active goal
(e.g., walking the dog) to a previously encoded goal (e.g., to
mail a letter). A thematically similar hypothesis was advanced by
(Klinger, 1975, 1977, 2009, and most recently, Klinger and Cox,
2011). According to Klinger’s Goal Theory of Current Concerns,
selective attention is largely determined by a person’s current
concerns. Current concerns are cognitive-affective motivational
states that are activated once a person commits to a goal and
remain active until either the goal is achieved or abandoned
(Klinger and Cox, 2011).
In typical laboratory studies of PM, participants perform an
ongoing task in which they are presented with a series of stimuli
requiring some classification [e.g., making word/non-word judg-
ments in a lexical decision task (LDT)]. In PM conditions, par-
ticipants are provided with an additional instruction to respond
differently if a particular target event happens in the future (e.g.,
“Press F1 if the word FLOWER appears”). Thus, these paradigms
are sensitive to participants’ ability to encode an intended future
action and to act on that intention at the appropriate time. It is
important to note that participants are not instructed to try to
think about the delayed intention while performing the ongoing
primary task. That is, participants are simply given an intention
to carry out but they do not receive specific instruction regarding
how (or whether) they should allocate attention to the PM task.
Indeed, participants are clearly instructed at the beginning of the
experiment that their primary objective is to perform the LDT as
quickly and accurately as possible. The PM instructions tend to
be delivered in such a way that participants are led to believe that
the cues might occur in the subsequent block of trials, though
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 693 | 1
Cohen Prospective memory and mind wandering
there is also a possibility that the cues will not appear. In this con-
text, thinking about the delayed intention while performing the
ongoing task is actually counterproductive to the primary task
objective which forms the majority of trials. Therefore, when the
mind wanders to thoughts about the intention while performing
the LDT, this attentional decoupling is similar to states such as
daydreaming or absented minded lapses. In these instances, con-
sideration of the primary task is reduced in favor of the active
consideration of internally generated thoughts related to the PM
task. Much research has demonstrated that PM tasks lead to inter-
ference costs in ongoing task performance (e.g., Smith, 2003;
Einstein et al., 2005; Hicks et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2012; but
see Einstein et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2009; for exceptions).
These interference costs are thought to occur because processing
of the ongoing task breaks down in favor of thoughts related to
the intention. In Cohen et al. (2008), participants performed an
ongoing LDT in which they were instructed to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible. Then, halfway through the task, par-
ticipants were given a PM task, specifically, to remember to make
a different response (press the F1 key) if 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 pre-
specified cues appeared during the LDT. Results revealed a linear
trend in which there was no significant increase in LDT latencies
with one or two PM targets but significant costs did emerge with
three or more targets. Therefore, in conditions of low cognitive
load, the delayed intention could be maintained in mind with no
observable costs to the primary task.
An important goal of the current paper was to replicate the
response time pattern from Cohen et al. (2008). In the Cohen
et al. (2008) study, accuracy data in the LDT was not recorded
and therefore not reported; Smith (2010) suggested that due to
the absence of accuracy data, response time data could not be
clearly interpreted. In Cohen et al. (2008), there were no ongo-
ing task costs when participants had one intention-related cue.
Smith (2010) proposed that this lack of ongoing task costs in the
one-word condition might have been due to sacrificing speed for
accuracy in the baseline block, leading to a greater speed increase
in Block 2, thereby canceling out the possibility of observing
costs in the one-word cue condition. This alternative interpreta-
tion could not be satisfactorily addressed in Cohen et al. (2008)
since accuracy on the LDT was not reported. Therefore, a goal
of this study was to analyze accuracy data so that Smith’s (2010)
interpretation could be properly examined.
Replicating findings from Cohen et al. (2008) allowed us to
investigate the potentially illuminative similarities and differences
between PM and mind wandering. In a typical mind wandering
paradigm, participants perform a primary task such as reading a
passage and then report on the number of times that attention
wanders spontaneously to thoughts unrelated to the ongoing task
(e.g., Schooler et al., 2004; Smallwood et al., 2008; Smallwood,
2011). In PM tasks, participants receive instructions for an ongo-
ing task (e.g., reading comprehension task) and must also make a
different response if a pre-specified intention-related target event
occurs. In a PM task paradigm, intention-related thoughts that
come to mind are comparable to mind wandering because they
cause attention to shift away from the primary task. Participants
must rely on their own strategies as to how they juggle the
primary task demands while also maintaining the intention. In
this PM context, thinking about the delayed intention while per-
forming the ongoing task is analogous to mind wandering in the
sense that it is actually counterproductive to the primary task
objective of performing well on the reading comprehension task.
Participants must strike a balance between devoting attention
to the primary task while not forgetting to execute the delayed
intention. Successful performance of a PM task involves periodic
shifts away from the primary task to thoughts about a previously
encoded intention. When participants are given a PM task, they
are not instructed to divert attention away from the primary task.
However, much like in mind wandering episodes, intervening
thoughts about an impending intention led to performance costs
very similar to those produced during mind wandering episodes.
Typically, mind wandering is thought to lead to performance
decrements, however, if disengaging from a primary task helps
to accomplish a desired future goal then mind wandering can
be constructive. If mind wandering helps one to advance toward
a desired goal, then mind wandering (or interference, in a PM
paradigm) can be thought of as “functional.” This idea of “func-
tional mind wandering” has been discussed by others (e.g.,
Klinger, 2009; Baird et al., 2011; Schooler et al., 2011) who suggest
that mind wandering can be of service in completing prospective
goals. As Klinger (2009) states, daydreams allow us to perform
important and central functions in our life by reminding us of
the details of our agenda. The interference costs in PM paradigms
may be an example of this special case of functional mind wander-
ing. Of course, the functionality of PM costs or mind wandering
depends on the perceived value of the ongoing activity and the
future goal/intention. For example, a professor disengaging from
teaching his class to think about an upcoming golf game would
not be functional, whereas a professor disengaging to think about
taking his heart medication would be.
CURRENT STUDY
In the current study, an objective was to replicate findings from
Cohen et al. (2008) while also examining how these data inform
us about mind wandering and the nuanced way that attention
shifts between ongoing activity and unresolved goals. Participants
performed one block of a LDT as a baseline in which they were
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to
letter strings. Then, halfway through the task, participants were
given a PM task in which they had to make a different response if
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 intention-related cues appeared during the LDT.
The interest was in determining how attention devoted to the pri-
mary LDT might vary according to cognitive load. Evidence from
Cohen et al. (2012) demonstrated material specific costs such that
reaction time costs to ongoing task performance emerged only on
trials where the stimuli matched those of the intention-related tar-
get. Therefore, reaction time responses in the current study were
analyzed separately for words and non-words trials in the LDT.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
A total of 136 Yeshiva University undergraduates volunteered
to participate in the experiment in exchange for course
credit. Each participant was tested individually in sessions that
lasted∼30min. The design was a 7 (Condition: control, one, two,
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three, four, five, or six targets) × 2 (LDT trial type: word, non-
word) × 2 (Block: Block 1, Block 2) mixed factorial design with
condition as a between-subjects factor and block (Block 1 or 2)
and LDT trial type as within-subject factors.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The protocol for this experiment was identical to Cohen
et al. (2008). Participants were tested on a Dell laptop com-
puter (Latitude/E6410). The experiment was performed using
Presentation software (Version 0.70, www.neurobs.com). The six
critical words used in this experiment had a medium level of
frequency and were chosen from the Kucera and Francis (1967)
norms. The lists in each block were matched with respect to fre-
quency (mean frequency of 135 for both blocks), word length,
and first letter. Non-words were created by moving the first sylla-
ble of each word to the end of each of the 126 total words (Hunt
and Toth, 1990). The order of appearance was random for all
string types. Participants made a total of 504 lexical decisions and
a PM target appeared approximately every 20th trial, however,
the number of intervening trials varied between targets so that
participants could not predict when they would occur.
Phase 1
During phase 1, participants completed a consent form, after
which instructions describing the experiment appeared on the
computer screen. The instructions regarding the LDT explained
to participants that letter strings would appear one at a time on
the computer screen and that participants had to decide whether
the letter string formed a word or a non-word. The instructions
were worded very carefully to emphasize that participants should
weigh accuracy and speed equivalently. Participants were then
asked to position each index finger on the “F” and “J” keys and
to press “F” if the string on the screen was a word and “J” if it
was not a word, or vice versa (assignment of the computer keys
“F” and “J” to words and non-words was counterbalanced across
participants). Participants performed a first block of lexical deci-
sion trials consisting of 126 word trials and 126 non-word trials
(252 in total). After the first block of trials, participants received
instructions for the second portion of the LDT as well as for the
embedded intention.
Phase 2
After the first block of LDT trials, participants received different
instructions depending on the condition to which they were ran-
domly assigned. Participants in the control condition were given
a retrospective memory task in which they were asked to memo-
rize six target words. They were told that they would have to recall
the six words and the associated response (pressing the F1 key) at
the end of the experiment as a memory check. This task served
as the control condition because the participants assigned to it
memorized words similar to the words in intention conditions
but did not have to monitor for PM cues during the LDT com-
ponent of the experiment. In other words, the PM component
of the task (i.e., detecting cues) was eliminated. Participants who
were randomly assigned to intention conditions were instructed
to press the F1 key on the computer keyboard (after first making
their lexical decision) if they saw any one of the PM targets during
the experiment. For participants in all conditions, we emphasized
the importance of their performance on the LDT and participants
were encouraged to respond as quickly and accurately as possible
with their word/non-word decisions. Of the participants in the
intention condition, those in the one word condition had 30 s to
memorize one word, and this target occurred 12 times during the
second block of trials. Participants in the two-word condition had
30 s to memorize two words, and these targets occurred 6 times
each during the second block of trials, for a total of 12 target
appearances. In the three-word condition, participants had 60 s
to memorize three words, and each of the three targets appeared
4 times in the second block for a total of 12 target occurrences.
In the four-word condition, participants had 60 s to memorize
the words, and each word occurred 3 times in the second block
for a total of 12 target appearances. In the five-word condition,
participants had 75 s to learn the five words and, since 12 is not
divisible by 5, five of the words appeared twice (for a total of 10
target appearances) and two of the words then appeared 2 more
times (for a total of 12 target appearances). We counterbalanced
across participants which two words appeared an extra 2 times. In
the six-word condition, participants had 120 s to learn the words,
and each of the six words appeared twice, for a total of 12 tar-
get appearances. In all conditions, participants had to learn the
words to criterion level, and the experiment did not proceed until
participants demonstrated perfect recall. If recall of the PM tar-
gets was not perfect in any condition, participants were given 2
additional min and learning cycled through the same study–test
procedure until it was perfect. PM targets occurred 12 times for
every condition (with the exception of the control condition);
therefore, we could isolate the manipulation of cognitive load.
A PM response was deemed correct if it was made at any point
before a word/non-word of the next trial was on the screen.
As previously mentioned, participants were instructed tomake
their lexical decision on each trial before making a PM response.
This aspect of the design allowed participants to avoid the need
to withhold their lexical decision response because they were
trying to decide whether the word was a PM target. After each
lexical decision keypress, participants were told that they could
make their PM response (by pressing “F1”) before a word/non-
word of the next trial was on the screen. The experimenter
explained that on each trial the message “Press the space bar”
would appear, indicating that participants should press the space
bar with one of their thumbs to initiate the next trial. After
reading the instructions, participants were asked to describe the
instructions to the experimenter (to check their comprehension).
They were then asked if they had any questions. After ques-
tions (if any) were answered, participants completed the two
blocks of the experiment. Upon completion of the experiment,
a post-experiment questionnaire was administered to test partic-
ipants’ recall of the PM target items and the associated action
(pressing “F1”).
RESULTS
An alpha level of 0.05 was used in all analyses unless otherwise
specified. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked
to recall the PM targets as a memory check. Post-experiment
recall of the PM targets was 100% recall for the one- through
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three-word conditions. Participants also had good recall for the
control, four-, five-, and six-word conditions (control: M = 5.09
out of 6; four-word:M = 3.87 out of 4; five-word: M = 4.69 out
of 5; six-word: M = 5.52 out of 6). There was no significant dif-
ference between conditions (p = 0.36). All participants recalled
the associated action of pressing “F1.”
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY TASK
The proportion of PM targets correctly detected as a function
of condition (number of PM targets: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) was sub-
mitted to a One-Way analysis of variance (ANOVA). In contrast
to findings from Cohen et al. (2008), results yielded a signifi-
cant effect of condition, F(5, 115) = 5.02, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18.
Planned pair-wise comparisons revealed a number of significant
differences. PM performance in the 1-word condition (83% cor-
rect) differed significantly from performance in the 5-word (69%
correct) and 6-word (58% correct) conditions (all ps < 0.032).
PM performance differed significantly (p < 0.001) between the
2-word (81% correct) condition and the 6-word condition (58%
correct). Performance in the 3-word condition (83% correct)
differed significantly (all ps < 0.028) from performance in the
5-word (69% correct) and 6-word (58% correct) conditions. See
Figure 1.
ONGOING TASK
Data trimming was done separately for each block and each trial
type for each participant. Several trials were excluded: (a) the ini-
tial five trials of Block 1 and Block 2; (b) trials that contained
PM targets; (c) the three trials that followed a PM trial; (d) trials
where RTs were greater than 2.5 SDs from a participant’s grand
mean; and (e) trials containing incorrect lexical decisions. Data
trimming resulted in less than 4% of trials being eliminated.
Accuracy
Accuracy in the LDT was fairly high (percent of errors ranged
from 2.6 to 4.3%) and did not differ by condition (p = 0.18) or
by block (p = 0.28). See Table 1 for percent errors as a function
of block and condition.
FIGURE 1 | Percent of prospective memory targets detected as a
function of condition. Bars represent standard error.
Reaction time costs
The average response time (RT) for word/non-word trials served
as the dependent measure. We conducted a 2 (Word Type: word,
non-word)× 2 (Block: block 1, block 2)× 7 (Condition: control,
1-word, 2-word, 3-word, 4-word, 5-word, 6-word) mixed facto-
rial ANOVA with Word Type and Block as within-subject factors
and Condition as a between-subjects factor. Results of this anal-
ysis revealed several significant effects. There was a main effect
of Word Type, F(1, 128) = 6.36, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.05 showing that
reaction times were faster for word trials (M = 621ms) com-
pared to non-word trials (M = 657ms). There was a significant
main effect of block, F(1, 128) = 8.66, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06, reveal-
ing that performance was significantly slower in block 2 (M =
648ms) compared to block 1 (M = 630ms). There was no main
effect of condition (p = 0.24). These main effects were qualified
by several significant interactions. There was a significant Block
× Word Type crossover interaction, F(1, 128) = 85.00, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.40 showing that on word trials performance was signif-
icantly slower in block 2 compared to block 1. In contrast, for
non-word trials, performance was faster in block 2 compared to
block 1. See Figure 2. There was a significant 3-way interaction,
F(6, 128) = 7.36, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26 which revealed a different
pattern of responding across conditions for word and non-word
trials. This interaction effect shows that reaction times increased
linearly in block 2 for word trials (reflecting increasing costs) from
the 2-word condition to the six-word condition, whereas perfor-
mance on non-word trials did not reflect this pattern of increasing
costs (see Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
In the current study, results replicated those of Cohen et al. (2008)
and more powerfully demonstrated that attentional costs vary
depending on the degree of cognitive load associated with a sus-
pended intention and the relevance of ongoing task stimuli to
the intention. In conditions in which cognitive load was high
Table 1 | Percent errors in the lexical decision task as a function of
block and condition.
M SD
BLOCK 1
Control 3.70 2.05
One word 2.56 1.82
Two word 3.63 1.72
Three word 2.48 2.01
Four word 3.10 2.78
Five word 2.47 1.56
Six word 4.34 3.87
BLOCK 2
Control 2.92 2.25
One word 3.74 3.18
Two word 3.95 2.57
Three word 2.74 1.71
Four word 3.64 3.38
Five word 2.65 1.87
Six word 4.33 3.30
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FIGURE 2 | Reaction time latencies measured in milliseconds as a
function of lexical decision task word type (Words, Non-words) and as
a function of block (Block 1, Block 2). Bars represent standard error.
FIGURE 3 | Upper panel represents reaction time latencies measured
in milliseconds on word trials in the lexical decision task as a function
of condition. Lower panel represents reaction time latencies measured in
milliseconds on non-word trials in the lexical decision task as a function of
condition. Bars represent standard error.
(3 or more intention-related targets), there were costs to ongo-
ing task performance. It is important to note that the observed
costs werematerial specific and only emerged on word trials in the
LDT and not on non-word trials. Smallwood and Schooler (2006)
claimed that much of the research on mind wandering had been
influenced by a simple limited-capacity account of cognition,
however, our data reflect a more nuanced pattern of responding.
Participants were able to stay focused on the primary task when
cognitive load was low and when stimuli were unrelated to the
intention.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF MINDWANDERING
Mind wandering is thought to occur as a result of decoupled pro-
cessing such that attention becomes coupled to internal thoughts
and decoupled from perceptual information (Smallwood et al.,
2003). However, it is important to understand what variables
initiate the moment of decoupling from ongoing activity. It is
difficult to ascertain from participants’ self reports the precise
moment that causes attention to be decoupled from a current
task. In Smallwood (2013), the author states “At present, our
inability to covertly detect the onset of self-generated mental
activity is the central barrier to addressing the fundamental ques-
tion raised by the phenomenon at both the theoretical and applied
level” (p. 2). Results from the current study showed that disen-
gaging from a primary task was more likely when (a) there was a
high degree of cognitive load associated with a goal, and (b) when
stimuli in the ongoing task were relevant to an unresolved goal. It
is intuitive that goals associated with higher cognitive load influ-
ence the amount of mind wandering. It may be that the higher
the cognitive load associated with a goal, then the more spreading
activation that occurs to potentially associated cues in the envi-
ronment. The current results also demonstrated that interference
costs varied on a trial by trial basis depending on the relevance
between the ongoing task stimulus and intention-related stim-
uli. That is, interference costs occurred solely on word trials in
the LDT but not on non-word trials. Participants may have been
unable to suppress intention-related thoughts due to the over-
lapping features between LDT words and the PM word targets
and these intention-related thoughts were less likely to arise on
non-word trials.
If mind wandering helps one to make progress toward a
desired goal, then these lapses of attention can be viewed as
instrumental. Given the frequency with which participants claim
to engage in mind wandering, it seems unlikely that it would
serve no functional role (Schooler et al., 2011). As mentioned
previously, disengaging from a primary task in order to advance
toward fulfilling a desired goal can be functional insofar as it
helps to accomplish a desired future. Baird et al. (2011) pro-
vided a detailed analysis of the content of off-task thought which
indicated that future oriented mind wandering usually involved
a combination of self-relevant and goal-directed content. Baird
et al. further suggested that the observed links between the self
and future thinking inmind-wanderingmay be attributed in large
part to the fact that prospective mind-wandering often involves
planning for the future goals of the individual. For these reasons,
interference costs in PM tasks can be thought of as a type of func-
tional mind wandering because decoupling from the primary task
serves the function of maintaining the intention in mind. In the
current study, it is interesting to note that when speed on the
ongoing task decreased in conditions of higher cognitive load, it
was not accompanied by better PM detection. In fact, PM accu-
racy decreased as a function of condition. Results showed that the
relationship between ongoing task performance and PM perfor-
mance was not functional as ongoing task costs did not lead to
better PM performance. The longer reaction times may reflect
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states of decoupled processing in which attention to the ongo-
ing LDT was reduced in favor of internally generated thoughts.
However, slowing in the LDT did not mean that it led to bet-
ter PM performance. There are two possibilities to explain this
finding. First, participants might have been more likely to decou-
ple from the LDT when cognitive load was high but thoughts
may have wandered to topics unrelated to the PM task. A second
more likely possibility is that conditions with high cognitive load
imposed such a difficult task requirement on participants that dis-
engaging from the LDT did not necessarily lead to improved PM
performance. For example, efforts to focus on internally gener-
ated thoughts about the PM task were in vain because due to task
difficulty—it did not result in improved PM performance.
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PATTERN OF INCREASING COSTS
An intriguing question is what accounted for the linear pat-
tern of increasing costs. It might be that the overall intention
came to mind on random trials and it took more time to cycle
through intention-related cues in conditions of higher cognitive
load. Alternatively, it might be that specific words in the LDT
were perceived as semantically related to PM targets triggering
thoughts of the intention. In this case, the higher the amount
of intention-related cues, then the more frequently the intention
would come to mind. It is impossible to answer this question with
the existing data. However, it may be that the pattern of increasing
costs occurred due to some or all of the following reasons: (a) it
takes longer to cycle through the cues when there are more cues
associated with an intention, and (b) when there are more cues
associated with an intention, there are more possibilities that a
LDT stimulus might overlap semantically with an intention word
leading to more frequent attention shifts, and (c) participants
might have weighed the PM task more heavily at the outset when
there were more cues associated with the intention and there-
fore the intention came to mind more frequently. It is important
for future research to arbitrate among these competing explana-
tions. Future research paradigms could directly address this issue
of what leads to decoupling from the ongoing task. One could
design a task in which participants are given PM instructions sim-
ilar to the current task. However, in one condition, there would
be 12 words included in the LDT that were semantically related
to the intention cue words. The interest would be in examining
whether there would be more ongoing task costs in the condi-
tion with the 12 semantically related non-target words compared
to the control condition. The results of this experiment might
yield interesting data regarding whether shifts of attention from
the ongoing task are initiated by specific words perceived to be
related to the intention cues or whether shifts occur on a random
basis.
Guynn’s (2003) two-process model of strategic monitoring
is useful when considering explanations for the current results.
Guynn (2003) makes a distinction between two types of monitor-
ing known as retrieval mode and item checking. When a person
must execute a future intention it can be said that the cognitive
system is in retrieval mode meaning that it is sensitive to the
future possibility of an intention occurring. Retrieval mode can
be thought of as similar to top-down strategies. When partici-
pants received the task instructions at the beginning of the task,
they may have adopted a top-down attention allocation strategy
in order to meet the demands of the ongoing LD task and PM
task (e.g., Marsh et al., 2006). Presumably, high cognitive load led
participants to weigh the PM task more heavily and allocate more
resources to maintaining that intention in mind, thereby yielding
more interference in the LD task. In line with this explanation,
Horn et al. (2011) analyzed previous data from Smith (2003)
using a cognitive process model known as the diffusion model
(e.g., Ratcliff, 1978). Horn et al. (2011) interpreted their results
to mean that including a PM task leads to more cautious speed-
accuracy settings which results in higher latencies. These findings
are similar to ideas expressed by Hicks et al. (2005) who sug-
gested that strategic attention allocation policies determine how
much attention will be devoted to the ongoing task and the PM
task. However, if participants devoted more attention to the PM
task in conditions of high cognitive load then one would expect
that the pattern of increasing costs should have been exhibited for
both word and non-word items. The material specific slowing in
the current task implies that the second component of Guynn’s
model may be more useful as an explanation. The second com-
ponent, item checking, involves post-stimulus checking for target
events. Item checking can be thought of as similar to bottom-up
strategies in which attention is devoted to the stimuli where the
retrieval cue would be expected to occur. For each item, the par-
ticipant must evaluate whether or not that stimulus is a retrieval
cue for an intended action. In terms of the current results, a more
probable explanation is that costs increased linearly due to par-
ticipants having to cycle through more PM targets in conditions
with higher numbers of targets. Item checking occurred on word
trials as opposed to non-word trials because word trials provided
a better match to the PM target items. It is worth noting that
participants were surprisingly flexible in how theymanaged atten-
tion devoted to intention relevant stimuli (words) and intention
irrelevant stimuli (non-words), even when these word/non-word
stimuli occurred randomly on a trial by trial basis.
This sensitivity to goal-related information is reinforced by
research by Klinger et al. who state: “. . . goal pursuit requires
more than a passive memory of the pursuit; it requires a con-
tinuing state of sensitization to stimuli relevant to the pursuit
and a readiness to act—to seize opportunities for attaining the
goal even while not consciously thinking about it” (Klinger and
Cox, 2011, p. 10). From a clinical perspective, cognitive the-
ories of anxiety, and studies examining selective attention to
threat, have emphasized the role of biases in attentional processes
(e.g., Mogg et al., 2000). Cox et al. (2006) used an addiction-
Stroop task to show that the strongest interference was found
in participants who had strong current concerns (e.g., Klinger
and Cox, 2011) about an addictive substance or in instances in
which concerns were highlighted through experimental manipu-
lations. As Cox et al. (2006) suggested, current concerns appear
to serve as a motivational modulatory system leading to hyper-
sensitivity to motivationally salient stimuli and sensitzing early
perceptual pathways for analyzing structural features of input
stimuli. Cox et al. continue to suggest that this causes automatic
screening of environmental stimuli and functions as a general
goal-lurking activity within themotivational system (p. 468). This
account is very useful in helping to explain the current finding in
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which participants were able to screen out non-words and attend
selectively to word stimuli.
REPLICATION OF Cohen et al. (2008)
The lack of costs in the one-word and two-word conditions
replicated findings from Cohen et al. (2008) and is in line with
Einstein et al.’s (2005) multiprocess framework which suggest
that intentions can be successfully executed in some instances
with no observable costs to ongoing activity. In the Cohen et al.
(2008) study, accuracy data in the LDT was not reported and
Smith (2010) suggested that due to the absence of accuracy data,
response times could not be clearly interpreted. Smith (2010)
stated that the Block 1 baseline response times from Cohen et al.
(2008) were rather high for the one-word condition. According
to Smith (2010), this pattern suggested that Cohen et al.’s partici-
pants may have sacrificed speed for accuracy in the baseline block.
However, the baseline response times in the current study are
much more in line with previous research (e.g., Smith et al., 2007;
Loft et al., 2008) and LDT accuracy did not differ from Block 1
to Block 2. Therefore, the absence of costs in conditions of low
cognitive load reflects that an intention can be realized with no
negative impact to ongoing task performance. It is rather puzzling
why Cohen et al. (2008) and the current study both demonstrated
no costs for the one-word condition which directly contradicts
findings from Smith et al. (2007) and Smith (2010). The only
explanation may be that there are subtle and nuanced differences
in the way that the instructions are administered to participants
which accounts for the different findings. It is hoped that future
studies may help to illuminate what these differences may be.
As shown in Figure 1, PM performance decreased as the num-
ber of PM targets increased. In contrast to Cohen et al. (2008), in
which there were no significant differences in PM accuracy across
conditions, the current results revealed that PM performance var-
ied significantly as a function of condition. The difference in
results could be due to a lack of power in the Cohen et al. (2008)
study, which had a fewer number of participants. The current
finding that PM performance varied as a function of the number
of targets is not surprising and is in line with previous research
(e.g., Marsh et al., 2003; Einstein et al., 2005).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
It is important to note that although there are intriguing simi-
larities between PM and mind wandering, there are also some
differences. For example, the commonalities between PM and
mind wandering only apply in cases when the contents of a
mind wandering episode are unresolved goals and prospective in
nature. Baird et al. (2011) showed that 48% of off-topic thought
was future oriented, however, 52% involved thoughts about the
present, past, and a small portion was devoted to thoughts with
no temporal focus. Another difference between mind wander-
ing and PM is that shifts away from a primary task in mind
wandering tends to be spontaneous and unintentional. While
attentional shifts in PM may at times be unintentional, they may
also be deliberate and/or strategic. Furthermore, the mental con-
tents during mind wandering episodes are often idiosyncratic to
the individual. In PM paradigms, however, the contents often
relate to the impending intention.
The contributions of this research represent the first pre-
liminary steps toward better understanding the links between
PM and mind wandering, however, it is important to note that
they were of a speculative nature. There is a need for future
research paradigms to disentangle the influences of unresolved
goals and other forms of task-unrelated thoughts and their influ-
ence on ongoing task costs. Furthermore, future research should
consider how the cognitive load associated with a goal influ-
ences mind wandering and what cues initiate decoupling from
the ongoing task? The results from the current paper demon-
strate that the higher the cognitive load associated with a PM
intention, then the more attention shifts away from the ongoing
task. One could imagine a comparable type of mind wander-
ing scenario. For example, if I have six things that I need to
do immediately following a meeting with a student, then it is
more likely that my mind will wander to these impending tasks
during the meeting compared to a day in which I may have
only one thing to do following the meeting. In the latter sit-
uation, I might be more able to focus on the primary task of
my meeting because there are fewer competing goals. To date,
no studies on mind wandering have examined the number of
cues greater than one associated with a goal, nor have they
examined the relevance of primary task stimuli to unresolved
goals.
An experiment is needed to examine whether increasing cogni-
tive load associated with a suspended goal increases the likelihood
that attention will be diverted away from ongoing activity toward
that goal. Research by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) showed that
information related to delayed intentions can be highly accessi-
ble, compared to information that is not future-oriented (i.e., the
intention superiority effect). In their paradigm, participants were
asked to memorize written descriptions of two activities, such as
setting the table (“Spread the table cloth. Distribute the cutlery”)
and clearing a messy desk (“Open the folder. Put in the files.”).
Then, participants in an “execute” condition were informed that
they would have to execute one of these scripts later, whereas
those in an “observe” condition were instructed that they would
later observe the experimenter carrying out one of the scripts.
Results showed that correct recognition responses were faster
for critical items related to the to-be-executed task compared to
the to-be-observed task yielding an intention superiority effect.
Interestingly, reaction times in this study on non-critical items
were numerically slower in the execute conditions compared to
the observation condition, although not reliable. However, this
numerical difference could indicate that participants’ thoughts
during the recognition memory test may have been more likely to
wander to the impending goal in the execute condition compared
to a condition in which they did not have to execute the inten-
tion. The Goschke and Kuhl (1993) task could be easily adapted to
investigate how cognitive load and the relevance of ongoing task
stimuli influence reaction time latencies on non-critical items as
an indication of mind wandering. For example, one could include
execute conditions that had scripts with low, medium, or high
cognitive load and also vary the number of script words that
appeared in the recognition memory test. One would predict that
reaction times on non-critical items would increase as a function
of cognitive load.
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 693 | 7
Cohen Prospective memory and mind wandering
CONCLUSIONS
Our data suggest that the human cognitive system is configured
in such a way that having an active goal does not impose equiva-
lent costs on all ongoing activities. Rather, attentional costs vary
depending on the degree of cognitive load associated with that
goal and the degree to which the ongoing task stimuli are rel-
evant to a goal. Most impressive is that attention costs varied
on a trial by trial basis in the current paradigm even though
participants could not possibly anticipate whether the next trial
would be a word or non-word. Thus, on some proportion of
word LDT trials, the appearance of a word stimulus might have
led to thoughts along the lines of “this stimulus reminds me
of something else I need to do . . . .” leading to longer reac-
tion times. The pattern of increasing costs and the specificity
of costs implies that even in cognitively demanding contexts,
participants are sensitive to the properties of stimuli and how
they relate to unresolved goals. This result is pertinent to mind
wandering research because it suggests that the likelihood of
mind wandering is greater when participants have goals with
high cognitive load and when external stimuli are present that
directly relate to an unfulfilled goal. Interference costs in PM
paradigms may be an example of this special case of “func-
tional mind wandering” (e.g., Schooler et al., 2011) in which
disengaging from the ongoing task serves an important function
of allocating attention to a delayed goal. However, as demon-
strated in the current study, higher rates of disengaging from an
ongoing activity do not necessarily ensure higher rates of goal
attainment.
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